Thoughts on the Market

Our Deputy Global Head of Research Michael Zezas and Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore assess the potential market outcomes of the Middle East conflict, weighing its possible duration and economic impact.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Deputy Global Head of Research.
Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research.
Michael Zezas: Today we're discussing the escalating U.S.-Iran conflict, the market reaction, and what investors should be watching for next.
It's Wednesday, March 4th at 7:30am in San Francisco.
Ariana Salvatore: And 10:30am in New York.
Michael Zezas: So, Ariana, I'm in San Francisco at Morgan Stanley's TMT Conference, but obviously events in the Middle East have captured everyone's attention. There's uncertainty around the conflict and really important questions about how it affects all of us. And of course, markets have to discount all sorts of future uncertainty about very specific impacts – to financial asset prices, to commodity prices – and really look at it through that narrow lens.
And so, Ariana, the administration has suggested that this conflict and this campaign could last a few weeks. But also it said it could continue as long as it takes. So, what are the clearest signals investors should watch for to gauge duration?
Ariana Salvatore: For now, we're focused on three main indicators. First, I would say, and most important, is clarity around the objectives. The president and others in the administration have referenced things like eliminating Iran's missile arsenal, its navy and limiting proxy activity. Those goals are broader than the earlier focus on just the nuclear programs. Each objective, of course, implies a different timeline. A narrower objective likely means a shorter engagement. Broader ambitions, conversely, would extend it. So that's the first thing.
Second, obviously extremely important is traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. We'd viewed a full closure as unlikely, given the economic consequences for Iran itself. But tanker flows have at least temporarily fallen close to zero, and that's significant because production across the region has not been impaired. This is not about oil fields going offline. It's about whether or not oil can actually move. If shipping lanes normalize within weeks, markets can recalibrate. However, if flows remain materially curtailed beyond five weeks, the risks rise meaningfully.
Third, the frequency of strikes and proxy activity. Sustained or escalating engagement would suggest a longer conflict. Signs of diplomacy, on the other hand, might indicate de-escalation.
Michael Zezas: Right. So, let's build on that and talk about oil. And our colleague, Martijn Rats has really laid this out with a lot of different scenarios. But what we're seeing right now is that when it comes to oil, this is really a shock to the transport of it, not necessarily a shock to its production. So, oil supply exists. The question is really – can it be delivered or not?
So, if tanker flows normalize and the geopolitical risk premium fades, what Martijn is saying is that global oil prices could move back towards $60 to $65 a barrel. If the logistical disruption lasts four to five weeks, then prices maybe trade in the $75 to $80 range. And if disruption extends beyond five weeks and flows are materially constrained, then you could see a situation where oil prices have to rise towards $120 or $130 a barrel. And at that level, demand destruction is what becomes the balancing mechanism in setting price for oil.
So, one signal to watch is longer dated oil prices. Early month contracts can spike during geopolitical stress, but a sustained move materially above $80 to $85 [per] barrel would likely require longer dated prices to move higher as well. And that might signal that markets believe the disruption is persistent and not temporary.
Ariana, what about natural gas here? How does gas situation fit into the energy story?
Ariana Salvatore: As of this recording, Qatar has halted liquified natural gas production putting roughly 20 percent of global supply at risk. Prices have, as you might expect, risen sharply, which likely reflects expectations of a relatively short disruption. If exports were to resume quickly, prices could retrace. But, of course, if the outage lasts longer, prices could move meaningfully higher. Again, duration of the conflict is really critical here.
Michael Zezas: So, let's bring this back to the U.S. Ariana, how does this conflict feed into the domestic, political and economic backdrop?
Ariana Salvatore: When we're thinking about the midterm elections later this year, the way we see it, the clearest transmission channel is gasoline prices. Polling shows a majority of Americans oppose military action related to Iran, but voters typically prioritize domestic issues: things like inflation, cost of living, affordability over foreign policy. However, there's a very clear caveat here. If oil prices stay elevated, gasoline prices rise, and that's where this becomes politically more salient.
Michael Zezas: Right, and so our economists and our chief U.S. Economist Michael Gapen has been all over this. And the way he assesses it is if oil prices remain about 10 percent higher than where they were before the conflict for several months, headline inflation would likely rise by 0.3 percent before dissipating. Historically, oil price shocks primarily affect headline inflation rather than underlying inflation. That's an important distinction that they point out.
So maybe that could delay Federal Reserve rate cuts, even if policymakers ultimately look through the move. But if oil prices rise enough to weaken economic activity, particularly in the labor market or consumer spending, then our economists say the Fed could pivot toward easing despite elevated inflation.
Ariana Salvatore: So, given that backdrop, what's the simple takeaway for investors in stocks or bonds?
Michael Zezas: Right. So, I think we have to think about this in terms of duration of conflict and economic impact. So, if tanker flows normalize within a few weeks and oil prices move back towards that $60 to $65 range, then our economists are saying economic damage would be limited. And historically geopolitical events alone have not led to sustained volatility for U.S. equities. So, in that environment, our cross-asset team points out that stocks would likely remain supported.
If instead, oil prices remain elevated long enough to push inflation higher and weigh on growth, the picture would change. A sharp and persistent rise in oil prices – that can pose a risk to the duration of the business cycle, and in that scenario, we'd expect stocks to struggle.
Importantly, bonds may not provide the same diversification benefit if inflation remains sticky as a consequence of all of this. We could see stock and bond prices move in the same direction. That could challenge traditional balanced portfolios.
Ariana Salvatore: And what are we seeing specifically in U.S. Treasury markets?
Michael Zezas: So, as Matt Hornbach and our global macro strategy team have pointed out here, you've got two competing forces in the U.S. Treasury market. There's been some demand for safety, but investors are also focused on the risk that higher oil prices would lift inflation. So far, inflation concerns have taken precedence over growth concerns. How long that balance holds – that might depend on incoming data, especially labor market data.
If you get weaker labor market data suggesting that growth could weaken, then you could see treasuries rally more meaningfully and yields come down. If you don't see that and inflation concerns dominate, then maybe you're not going to see yields come down as much. And bonds rally as much.
Ariana Salvatore: So, stepping back, it seems like the key variables remain tanker traffic, longer dated oil prices and duration of the conflict itself.
Michael Zezas: I think that's right. Ariana, thanks for speaking with me.
Ariana Salvatore: Always a pleasure, Mike.
Michael Zezas: And thanks to our listeners for joining us. We'll continue tracking developments and what they mean for markets. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague.

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Our Hong Kong/China Transportation & Infrastructure Analyst Qianlei Fan discusses how China’s travel industry is shifting from a post-pandemic rebound to a multi-year expansion.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Qianlei Fan, Morgan Stanley’s Hong Kong / China Transportation Analyst. Today, I'll share my thoughts on why travel is quickly emerging as one of [the] key drivers of China's economic rebalancing.
It’s Tuesday, March the 3rd, at 2pm in Hong Kong.
I've just gotten back from my Lunar New Year trip to mainland China. With the longest Chinese New Year break in history, people were out roaming, exploring, laughing, and the whole country felt like it was buzzing with people on a mission to enjoy every minute.
According to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, total domestic tourism spending recorded a robust 19 percent year-on-year growth during the holiday. In fact, China’s tourism industry isn’t just rebounding after the pandemic. It’s entering a structurally stronger phase, supported by policy tailwinds, demographic shifts, and a clear pivot toward experience-driven consumption.
By 2030, tourism revenue could reach RMB 12 trillion – equal to roughly USD $1.7 trillion – implying 11 percent annual growth from the mid-2020s. Over the next five years, cumulative domestic and inbound revenue may approach RMB 50 trillion, or USD $7.2 trillion.
That scale makes travel more than a cyclical recovery – it’s becoming a core pillar of China’s consumption-led growth. We expect tourism’s share of GDP to rise to about 6.7 percent by 2030, up from 4.8 percent in 2024.
Domestic travel remains the backbone. People aren’t just traveling again; they’re traveling more than before.
Policy is reinforcing demand. Extended public holidays, new school breaks, and event-driven tourism are boosting activity. In 2025 alone, around 3,000 large-scale performances attracted more than 43 million attendees. And spending reflects that shift. Domestic tourism spending reached RMB 6.3 trillion in 2025, about 11 percent above pre-COVID levels. Even with slightly lower spend per trip, more frequent travel is lifting overall revenue.
International travel is emerging as a second growth engine. By 2030, inbound travel could represent 16 percent of total tourism revenue. In late 2025, inbound visitor growth in major cities was up about 30–50 percent year-over-year, supported by expanded visa-free access, which now accounts for the majority of foreign arrivals. These visitors often stay longer and spend more. Outbound travel is strengthening too. International air traffic grew 22 percent in 2025, far outpacing domestic growth, and now contributes a meaningful share of airline revenue.
Demographics and technology are reinforcing the trend. Younger consumers prioritize travel, while older households – with substantial savings – are beginning to spend more as services improve. At the same time, smart hotels, virtual reality attractions, and data-driven operations are enhancing engagement and willingness to pay.
This isn’t just pent-up demand. It’s policy, demographics, technology, and supply aligning at once. – with travel at the center of China’s consumption story.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur and U.S. Head of Credit Strategy Vishwas Patkar discuss the implications of private credit’s exposure to the software industry.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist.
Vishwas Patkar: I'm Vishwas Patkar, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Head of Credit Strategy.
Vishy Tirupattur: While potential disruption from AI has been a key driver for markets [in the] last few weeks, the focus of investor agenda has been in the software sector. On today's podcast, we will talk about software in the credit markets and its implications.
It's Monday, March 2nd at 10am in New York.
Vishwas, let's start by understanding how the exposure in software manifests in the credit markets. How does it compare to software, say, in the equity market?
Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so the software exposure in credit markets is large, and understandably that's why investors are closely watching what's happening with software in the equity market. But what's interesting and important for investors to note is the exposure in credit is very different from what it is in equities.
So, for instance, a good chunk of exposure in the credit market is around private issuers. So, we estimate about 80 percent of companies are private in the whole sample set that we looked at. And that's largely a function of the fact that software is not a big part of the more liquid spaces like Investment Grade and High Yield. But it is heavily represented in the more opaque parts of the market, like leveraged loans, CLOs, and, you know, BDCs.
So, our analysis found that about 25 percent of BDC portfolios are in software, closely followed by private credit CLOs. And leveraged loan market was about 16 percent. So, that's an important distinction to keep in mind versus the equity market.
The second thing I would flag is – because the software sector grew a lot in the loan market through the LBO wave of 2020 and 2021, it has a weaker credit quality skew to it than the overall market. So about 50 percent of borrowers in the sector are rated B - or lower. So, that's the lowest rungs of the rating spectrum.
Many of these software deals were underwritten with higher leverage than the broad market. And as a result of that you also have more front-loaded maturities in the sector, which brings the risks of refinancing, if some of this disruption persists.
But Vishy, that's a nice segue to you. Over the past couple of years, you looked at the private credit market in depth and that's where I think the exposure we found is the highest in BDCs, you know, which is the public face of private credit. So, in your assessment, what is the risk of software to private credit, given all of the headlines that are popping up?
Vishy Tirupattur: Public face of private credit – Vishwas, that's a great line.
BDCs – business development corporations for those who are not familiar – are companies that invest in the debt of small and medium sized companies, sourced through non-bank channels. BDCs fund themselves through equity and debt issuance. So, if you look at the portfolios of BDCs to look at their exposure to software, there's a wide variation across the various BDC portfolios.
What makes the assessment of these software risks in BDCs challenging is that many of these companies are private companies without the reporting obligations of public companies. So, no earnings reports, no 10-Ks or cues or broadly publicly available financials look at.
So, in effect, these companies need to be re underwritten to evaluate which of these companies would be disrupted from AI; and which companies could actually benefit from AI and see their margins expand. So, in the context of BDCs, liability spreads are something we are watching closely. BDC liability spreads have widened but we think more needs to happen there. The clearing levels need to wait for the full resolution of the companies that benefit and that get hurt by disruption that is still awaited. So, we expect credit spreads of BDCs to remain volatile for some time to come.
Vishwas Patkar: Okay. So, seems like this is a significant, or at least a non-trivial risk factor for credit markets, given the growth of the sector, leverage, the skew and quality. But Vishy, do you think this could be systemic for risk markets at large?
Vishy Tirupattur: So, I do think that this is a significant risk, but I don't think it's a systemic risk. The amount of leverage in BDC is fairly small. About 2x is the kind of leverage. You compare that to the kind of leverage that existed in the financial system before the financial crisis – that’s orders of magnitude smaller risk. And also the linkage to the banking system comes through the back leverage provided to the non-bank lenders. But this leverage is substantially risk remote with very high subordination levels. So, my conclusion here is this is a significant risk but not a systemic risk.
So let me turn the same question to you, Vishwas. Taking on a sort of historical perspective as well as a macro perspective, how do you see this risk manifesting in the broader credit space?
Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so I would agree with you Vishy, that we need to see a valuation reset. We think spreads should go wider because of disruption concerns, even if they affect a relatively narrow part of the market. But a lot of that's happening against issuance that's rising. But I would say the risk of systemic concerns really emerging is relatively low. if you look at historical cycles where credit has been the weak link in the economy, those are typically characterized by a lot of corporate re-leveraging.
So, think about the late 1990s or from 2004 to 2007 or the early 2000-teens. These are all cycles where corporates were being very aggressive, adding a lot of debt. And you know, when the economy slowed, credit became the source of some default and downgrade concerns.
We haven't really seen that type of credit cycle play out at all in the past few years. If you look at corporate debt to GDP, for example, it's gone down each of the last five years. Balance sheet corporate leverage has been flat or actually gone lower in spots. M&A activity, which is usually a good indicator of corporate aggressiveness, still remains below trend. So, I think we have had a fairly restrained credit cycle where in place fundamentals are quite strong. And that's why I think the systemic contagion from any credit spread weakness, I think could be relatively muted.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, the key takeaway from us is that software and credit is a significant risk but is not quite systemic risk.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Deputy Head of Global Research Michael Zezas and Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic and Sustainability Research, discuss how the U.S. is positioning AI as a pillar of geopolitical influence and what that means for nations and investors.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

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Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Deputy Head of Global Research.
Stephen Byrd: And I'm Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic and Sustainability Research.
Michael Zezas: Today – is AI becoming the new anchor of geopolitical power?
It's Wednesday, February 27th at noon in New York.
So, Stephen, at the recent India AI Impact Summit, the U.S. laid out a vision to promote global AI adoption built around what it calls “real AI sovereignty.” Or strategic autonomy through integration with the American AI stack. But several nations from the global south and possibly parts of Europe – they appear skeptical of dependence on proprietary systems, citing concerns about control, explainability, and data ownership. And it appears that stake isn't just technology policy. It's the future structure of global power, economic stratification, and whether sovereign nations can realistically build competitive alternatives outside the U.S. and China.
So, Stephen, you were there and you've been describing a growing chasm in the AI world in terms of access to strategies between the U.S. and much of the global south, and possibly Europe. So, from what you heard at the summit, what are the core points of disagreement driving that divide?
Stephen Byrd: There definitely are areas of agreement; and we've seen a couple of high-profile agreements reached between the U.S. government and the Indian government just in the last several days. So there certainly is a lot of overlap. I point to the Pax Silica agreement that's so important to secure supply chains, to secure access to AI technology. I think the focus, for example, for India is, as you said; it is, you know, explainability, open access. I was really struck by Prime Minister Modi's focus on ensuring that all Indians have access to AI tools that can help them in their everyday life.
You know, a really tangible example that really stuck with me is – someone in a remote village in India who has a medical condition and there's no doctor or nurse nearby using AI to, you know, take a photo of the condition, receive diagnosis, receive support, figure out what the next steps should be. That's very powerful. So, I'd say, open access explainability is very important.
Now, the American hyperscalers are very much trying to serve the Indian market and serve the objectives really of the Indian government. And so, there are versions of their models that are open weights, that are being made freely available for health agencies in India, as an example; to the Indian government, as an example.
So, there is an attempt to really serve a number of objectives, but I think this key is around open access, explainability, that I do see that there's a tension.
Michael Zezas: So, let's talk about that a little bit more. Because it seems one of the concerns raised is this idea of being captive within proprietary Large Language Models. And maybe that includes the risk of having to pay more over time or losing control of citizen data. But, at the same time, you've described that there are some real benefits to AI that these countries want to adopt.
So, what is effectively the tension between being captive to a model or the trade off instead for pursuing open and free models? Is it that there's a major quality difference? And is that trade off acceptable?
Stephen Byrd: See, that's what's so fascinating, Mike, is, you know, what we need to be thinking about is not just where the technology is today, but where is it in six months, 12 months, 24 months? And from my perspective, it's very clear. That the proprietary American models are going to be much, much more capable.
So, let's put some numbers around that. The big five American firms have assembled about 10 times the compute to train their current LLMs compared to their prior LLMs, and that's a big deal. If the scaling laws hold, then a 10x increase in training compute to result in models are about twice as capable.
Now just let that sink in for a minute, twice as capable from here. That's a big deal. And so, when we think about the benefit of deploying these models, whether it's in the life sciences or any number of other disciplines, those benefits could start to get very large. And the challenge for the open models will be – will they be able to keep up in terms of access to compute, to training, access to data to train those models? That's a big question.
Now, again, there's room for both approaches and it's very possible for the Indian government to continue to experiment and really see which approach is going to serve their citizens the best. And I was really struck by just how focused the Indian government is on serving all of their citizens. Most notably, you know, the poorest of the poor in their nation. So, we'll just have to see.
But the pure technologist would say that these proprietary models are going to be increasing capability much faster than the open-source models.
So, Mike, let's pivot from the technology layer to the geopolitical layer because the U.S. strategy unveiled at the summit goes way beyond innovation.
Michael Zezas: Yeah, it's a good point. And within this discussion of whether or not other countries will choose to pursue open models or more closely adhere to U.S. based models is really a question about how the United States exercises power globally and how it creates alliances going forward.
Clearly some part of the strategy is that the U.S. assumes that if it has technology that's alluring to its partners, that they'll want to align with the U.S.’ broad goals globally. And that they'll want to be partners in supporting those goals, which of course are tied to AI development.
So, the Pax Silica [agreement], which you mentioned earlier, is an interesting point here because this is clearly part of the U.S. strategy to develop relationships with other countries – such that the other countries get access to U.S. models and access to U.S. AI in general. And what the U.S. gets in return is access to supply chain, critical resources, labor, all the things that you need to further the AI build out. Particularly as the U.S. is trying to disassociate more and more from China, and the resources that China might have been able to bring to bear in an AI build out.
Stephen Byrd: So, Mike, the U.S. framed “real AI sovereignty” as strategic autonomy rather than full self-sufficiency. So, essentially the. U.S. is encouraging nations to integrate components of the American AI stack. Now, from your perspective, Mike, from a macro and policy standpoint, how significant is that distinction?
Michael Zezas: Well, I think it's extremely important. And clearly the U.S. views its AI strategy as not just economic strategy, but national security strategy.
There are maybe some analogs to how the U.S. has been able to, over the past 80 years or so, use its dominance in military and military equipment to create a security umbrella that other countries want to be under. And do something similar with AI, which is if there is dominant technology and others want access to it for the societal or economic benefits, then that is going to help when you're negotiating with those countries on other things that you value – whether it be trade policy, foreign policy, sanctions versus another country. That type of thing.
So, in a lot of ways, it seems like the U.S. is talking about AI and developing AI as an anchor asset to its power, in a way that military power has been that anchor asset for much of the post World War II period.
Stephen Byrd: See, that's what's so interesting, Mike, [be]cause you've highlighted before to me that you believe AI could replace weaponry as really the anchor asset for U.S. global power. Almost a tech equivalent of a defense umbrella.
So how durable is that strategy, especially given that some countries are expressing unease about dependency?
Michael Zezas: Yeah, it's really hard to know, and I think the tension you and I talked about earlier, Stephen, about whether countries will be willing to make the trade off for access to superior AI models versus open and free models that might be inferior, that'll tell us if this is a viable strategy or not. And it appears like this is still playing out because, correct me if I'm wrong, it's not like we've received some very clear signals from India or other countries about their willingness to make that trade off.
Stephen Byrd: No, I think that's right. And just building on the concept of the trade-offs and, sort of, the standard for AI deployment, you know, the U.S. has explicitly rejected centralized global AI governance in favor of national control aligned with domestic values.
So, what does that signal about how global technology standards may evolve, particularly as in the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST, works to develop interoperable standards for agentic AI systems.
Michael Zezas: Yeah, Stephen, I think it's hard to know. It might be that the U.S. is okay with other countries having substantial degrees of freedom with how they use U.S.-based AI models because they could use U.S. law to, at a later date, change how those models are being used – if there's a use case that comes out of it that they find is against U.S. values. Similar in some way to how the U.S. dollar being the predominant currency and, therefore, being the predominant payment system globally, gives the U.S. degrees of freedom to impose sanctions and limit other types of economic transactions when it's in the U.S. interest.
So, I don't know that to be specifically true, but it's an interesting question to consider and a potential motivation behind why a laissez-faire approach might be, ultimately, still aligned with U.S. interests.
Stephen Byrd: So, Michael, it sounds like really AI is becoming the new strategic infrastructure globally.
Michael Zezas: Yeah, I think that's actually a great way to think about it. And so, Stephen, if that were the case, and we're talking about the potential for this to shape geopolitical competition, potentially economic differentials across the globe. And if that is correlated, at least, to some degree with the further development and computing power of these models, what do you think investors should be looking at for signals from here?
Stephen Byrd: Number one, by a mile for me, is really the pace of model progress. Not just American models, but Chinese models, open-source models. And there the big reveal for the United States should be somewhere between April and June – for the big five LLM players. That's a bit of speculation based on tracking their chip purchases, their power access, et cetera. But that appears to be the timeframe and a couple of execs have spoken to that approximate timeframe.
I would caution investors that I think we're going to be surprised in terms of just how powerful those models are. And we're already seeing in early 2026, these models that were not trained on that kind of volume of compute have really exceeded expectations, you know, quite dramatically in some cases. And I'll give you one example.
METR is a third-party that tracks the complexity, what these models can do. And METR has been highlining that every seven months, the complexity of what these models are able to do approximately doubles. It’s very fast. But what really got my attention was about a week ago, one of the LLMs broke that trend in a big way to the upside.
So, if the scaling laws would hold, based on what METR would've expected, they would expect a model to be able to act independently for about eight hours, a little over eight hours. And what we saw was, the best American model that was recently introduced was more like 15. That's a big deal. And so, I think we're seeing signs of non-linear improvement.
We're also going to see additional statements from these AI execs around recursive self-improvement of the models. One ex-AI executive spoke to that. Another LLM exec spoke to that recently as well. So, we're starting to see an acceleration. That means we then need to really consider the trade-offs between the open models and the proprietary. That's going to become really critical and that should happen really through the spring and summer.
Michael Zezas: Got it. Well, Stephen, thanks for taking the time to talk.
Stephen Byrd: Great speaking with you, Mike.
Michael Zezas: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen. And share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Our Global Commodities Strategist Martijn Rats discusses the geopolitical drivers behind the recent spike in oil prices and outlines four Iran scenarios.
Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

----- Transcript -----

Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Martijn Rats, Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities Strategist.
Today – what’s fueling the latest oil market rally.
It’s Thursday, February 26th, at 3pm in London.
What happens when oil prices jump, even though there’s no actual shortage of oil? That’s the situation we’re in right now. Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have escalated again. Naturally, markets are paying attention.
Over the past week, Brent crude rose about $3 to around $72 per barrel. WTI climbed into the mid-$60s. Shipping costs surged. And traders have started paying a premium for protection against a sudden oil spike – the levels we haven’t seen since the early days of the Ukrainian invasion.
But here’s the key point: there’s no clear evidence that global oil supply has tightened. Exports are still flowing. Tankers are still moving. And some near-term indicators of physical tightness have actually softened. When oil is truly scarce, buyers scramble for immediate barrels and short-term prices spike relative to future delivery. Instead, those spreads have narrowed, and physical premiums have eased.
This isn’t a supply shock. It’s a risk premium. In simple terms, investors are buying insurance. So what could happen next? We see four broad scenarios.
Before I outline them though, here’s something we do not see as a core case: a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly 15 million barrels per day of crude and another 5 million of refined product moves through that corridor. A sustained shutdown would be enormously disruptive. But we think the probability is very low.
Now coming back to our four scenarios. The first is straightforward. A negotiated settlement; conflict is avoided. Iranian exports continue and shipping lanes remain open. In that scenario, what unwinds is the geopolitical risk premium – which we estimate at roughly $7 to $9 per barrel. If that fades, Brent could drift back to the low-to-mid $60s, similar to past episodes where prices spiked on fear and then retraced once supply proves unaffected.
Second, we could see short-lived frictions – shipping delays, higher insurance costs, temporary logistical issues. That might remove a few hundred thousand barrels per day for, say, a few weeks.. Prices could briefly spike into the $75–80 range. But balancing forces would kick in relatively quickly. For example, China has been building inventories at a steady pace. At higher prices, that stockbuilding would likely slow, helping offset temporary disruptions. That points to some further upside in prices – but then normalization.
The third scenario is more serious, but still contained: localized export losses of perhaps 1 to 1.5 million barrels per day for a month or two. Prices would stay elevated longer, but spare capacity and demand adjustments could eventually stabilize the market.
Now our last scenario is the more serious and considers a potential shipping shock. The real risk here isn’t wells shutting down – it’s shipping disruption. Global trade of crude oil depends on efficient tanker movement. If transit times were extended even modestly, effective shipping capacity could fall sharply, creating what amounts to a temporary tightening of about 2 to 3 million barrels per day – or about 6 percent of global seaborne supply. That is a logistics shock, not a production outage – but it would push prices toward early-2022-type levels, at least briefly.
Now let’s zoom out. Beyond geopolitics, the fundamentals look weak. OPEC+ supply is rising, and our forecasts show a sizable surplus building in 2026. Even if some of that oil ends up in China’s stockpiles, a lot would still likely flow into core OECD inventories. Historically, when the market looks like this, prices tend to fall, not rise.
Which brings us back to the central point. Oil isn’t rallying because the world has run out of barrels. It’s rallying because markets are pricing geopolitical risk. And unless that risk turns into actual, sustained disruption, insurance premiums tend to expire.
Thank you for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.
This podcast references jurisdiction(s) or person(s) which may be the subject of economic sanctions. Readers are solely responsible for ensuring that their investment activities are carried out in compliance with applicable laws.