The Trivium China Podcast

When it comes to China’s key nodes of economic leverage, rare earths get all the attention – because they’re the cheapest, easiest lever China has to pull.
But the more durable – and future – points of leverage are already hiding in plain sight, in hundreds of intermediate goods most people never think about.
Gerard DiPippo, Director of Global Macro at Eurasia Group, returns to the pod as our first ever two-time guest, joined by Dinny McMahon and Cory Combs, to unpack it.
On this episode, host Andrew Polk sits down with Gerard, Dinny, and Cory to dive into:
Why rare earths are a uniquely cheap and low-cost weapon for Beijing, and why other chokepoints like batteries carry far higher stakes
How China’s licensing regime doubles as a surveillance system, giving Beijing visibility into global supply chains it can use to ratchet pressure up or down at will
The “shoe that hasn’t dropped yet”: China’s shelved extraterritorial rule that could restrict any product containing Chinese-origin content, anywhere in the world
Why intermediate goods are the next frontier to watch, and why China’s reaction function gets a lot murkier once controls move further down the production chain – into products with real commercial value to Chinese firms themselves
It’s another great discussion – so enjoy!

On August 5th, China dropped a new batch of retaliatory economic measures against various US entities.
And this time, officials did something they rarely do – naming exactly which US actions they were responding to and why.
On this episode of the Trivium China Podcast, Andrew Polk sits down with Cory Combs (Head of Supply Chain and Critical Minerals Research) to unpack:
What exactly landed in MofCom’s four-part policy package – from countersanctions on US biotech and compliance firms to China’s first ever foreign-trade national security investigation
Why this round of retaliation was aimed squarely at the FCC and DHS, and how it traces back to actions on robotics, drones, and forced-labor sanctions
Whether Beijing’s unusually direct language about the Busan detente is a warning shot or a sign the deal is really at risk
Why neither side seems ready to blow up the agreement just yet, even as both keep testing its edges

US policymakers are constantly discussing whether America can leapfrog China in key technologies.
Our answer: probably not, and batteries prove it.
In fact, the real question isn't whether the US can – or even should – try to outpace China in at least some advanced tech; it's whether the West can afford not to learn from China.
On this podcast episode, Andrew Polk sits down with Cory Combs (Head of Supply Chain and Critical Minerals Research) to unpack:
Why China is placing simultaneous bets on LFP, sodium-ion, and solid-state batteries, and what that "multi-modal" strategy reveals about how it actually innovates
How brutal domestic competition, not central planning, is driving some of China's biggest technological breakthroughs
Why Beijing tolerates crushing margin pressure on its own battery makers, and what it's betting that pain buys
The uncomfortable case for the US actually licensing "second-best" Chinese tech, rather than racing to rebuild it from scratch

Beijing just released its most detailed rebuttal yet to accusations from the West around industrial overcapacity – and it pointedly avoided using the very word that started the fight in the first place.
There’s a reason for that, and we break it all down in today’s podcast.
On this episode, Andrew Polk sits down with Dinny McMahon (Head of Markets Research) to unpack:
The five core arguments in MOFCOM’s new position paper on overcapacity, examining which ones hold up and which ones stretch too far
Why Beijing dropped the word “overcapacity” for “involution” 18 months ago, and what that rhetorical swap is designed to do
How China frames itself as both free trade’s champion and its victim, and why that framing leaves little room for compromise
Why the US may have the least at stake here economically, and why Europe is where this fight actually gets decided
As always, we hope you enjoy the discussion – reach out and let us know any thoughts or feedback.

China's July Politburo meeting is always a big one, as the leadership takes stock of the economy and signals policy adjustments for the second half of the year.
In this year’s July meeting, officials clearly signaled that more fiscal support is on the way, but only in modest amounts.
Note: This is our second short format episode – tighter, quick-turnaround reactions to the news as it breaks, alongside our regular weekly deep dives.
Let us know what you think about the new format!
On this episode, Andrew Polk sits down with Dinny McMahon (Trivium’s Head of Markets Research) to unpack:
How this July Politburo readout offered surprisingly clear language that more fiscal support is coming, and in what form
What "fiscal-financial cooperation" means in practice, and why it's really code for interest rate subsidies
Why Beijing is likely to lean on accelerated special-purpose bond issuance – and a probable Q4 top-up, following last year's playbook – rather than broad interest rate cuts
Why none of this changes the underlying story: Beijing is deliberately riding out a long, painful real estate adjustment – and this is just a slight pick-me-up