Operation Hooper had ended in failure for the SADF and back in Pretoria, it was time to reassess the political and military situation. What had been achieved after 23 years of war - fighting ostensibly to stop SWAPO from seizing control of Namibia but really a war to buffer the apartheid state from the sweeping post-colonial independence movements. This was no longer possible in 1988 because the Cold War was rapidly coming to an end. The Soviet Union experiment in communism has failed as an experiment, ironically it was failing at precisely the moment that the whites-only lunacy in South Africa was failing. These two countries, Russia and South Africa, shared a common dawn. It was a moment that was to change both, and to alter world history. While Russia and South Africa were indulging in this long term military dance across southern Africa, the Americans and the Cubans hadn’t been far away. Perhaps its more accurate to say that both Havana and Washington had been directly involved in these distant wars, both had ideological reasons to send their advisors and troops, their operators and specialists into the region. Propaganda and hoopla replaced a proper analysis. On the Cuban and Angolan side, they trumpeted what they called a great victory at Cuito Cuanavale. The only problem was there was never a battle of Cuito Cuanavale. It wasn’t like Stalingrad, fighting in the streets. But it was like the Battle of Moscow in the Second World War. There the Germans never reached the city, fighting for months outside the western edges, never defeating the Russians. The battles around Cuito Cuanavale were a bit like this. Now that the fighting had subsided, both sides licked their wounds. Behind the scenes, however, diplomacy was the real game. The soviet Union’s deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin had been meeting both Cuban and Angolan leaders and pressurising them to talk peace. The USSR was bankrupt and could no longer send men and weapons to their satellite states.

More than two decades of conflict in Ovamboland and southern Angola had worn down South African military domination - tactical superiority was no longer certain. The initial approach which had been innovative and inspirational, fast, seat of the pants and smart, had slumped into attritional raging bull blow for blow brutality. It was March 1988, time for one last push by the SADF against their FAPLA enemy and their Cuban and Russian allies. As you heard last episode, Commandant Gerhard Louw and most experienced officers of the Border War thought the overall plan to attack the Tumpo Triangle for the third time was a bad idea. Jan Breytenbach called it truly misguided. Cuban president Fidel Castro had made it very clear that he wanted the East bank of the Cuito River held at all costs. As long as the Cubans, Angolans and Russians held the bridgehead, it meant the SADF could not attack the town directly. Not that this was the South African’s aim - at least not their official aim. The plan was merely to seize the east bank, cross over to the West side, blow up the bridge which would put an end to FAPLAs assaults on the UNITA held towns of Mavinga and Jamba. However, the Angolans thought that Cuito Cuanavale was the main target and so did many South African troops fighting against FAPLA. I mean, there was the strategic town right in front of them, do you seriously think that had the Angolan army broken and run, that the SADF would have stopped across the Cuito River? So with that small diversion as a way of introduction, we rejoin Commandant Gerhard Louw and his ou-manne. IT’s Four pm on Tuesday 22nd March 1988, and the attackers were heading towards FAPLAs well defended positions on the east bank of the Cuito River 32 Battalion and Groot Karoo Regiment troops were joined by UNITAs 4th Regular Battalion on the western slope of the Chambinga High ground sweeping the area and trying to blunt any FAPLA reconnaissance from moving east of the Amhara Lipanda flatlands. UNITA spent a lot of time lifting mines, but it wasn’t enough, more than 15 000 landmines awaited the SADF and this was going to lead to a lot of trouble for the Olifant tanks. Laid in layers, the Cubans had doubled up the fields of death by laying anti-tank mines along with 130mm shells, when these detonated, the effect would be biblical.

The Third Battle of the Tumpo Triangle was about to begin - the date - 23rd March 1988. The weary 61 Mechanised battalion had withdrawn, the men exhausted after 4 months of shifting about and fighting FAPLA, while their equipment was in worse shape. By 13th March the tattered 20 Brigade of which 61 Mech was part had arrived back at Rundu across the Kunene River and for the third and final attack on the Triangle, Pat McLoughlin had returned command to Colonel Paul Fouche. IF you remember last episode, he’d been sent back to the Republic to try and drum up another Brigade which he’d found difficult. So he’d turned to the ou-manne - the campers or the Citizen Force as it was known. Fresh troops were brought in from South Africa, mostly from 82 Mechanised Brigade and this would be the first time since 1984 that the Citizen Force would furnish most of the troops of the upcoming Operation Packer. When you hear the makeshift formation you’ll understand that this operation was not going to be easy for any commander, however motivated the men were. The reality was these were soldiers who were part-timers, they may have been excellent as National Servicemen, but now they were back in civvie street, mentally they had to now contend with wives and children far away, they were accountants and teachers. Helping Fouche put together a viable force was commandant Gerhard Louw, the tank and armoured car instructor at the South African Battle School based at Lohatla in the northern Cape. The haphazard nature of Pretoria’s tactical planning and strategic understanding of how the fight a mobile war with tanks and infantry in thick bush was going to upend another group of tough South African soldiers. The Generals who were now interfering in all decisions, along with Cabinet members, were a hindrance to the officers on the ground, at least according to their accounts. The West Bank of the Cuito River was bristling with artillery of all kinds, massed in places to provide truly phenomenal fire-power. There were batteries of the D-30 122mm guns, M-46 or 130mm heavy artillery, BM-21 122mm rockets, and BM-14 140mm multiple rocket launchers. Protecting these from the Recces and SADF forward Artillery observers, A battalion of 36 Brigade was stationed between the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers to protect the Angolan artillery from the Recces and SADF forward Artillery observers, while another battalion from 36 Brigade had moved west of the Cuito River. Russian advisors were making a big difference by now, along with the Cubans. They were adding a great deal of skill to FAPLAs basic fighting capacity. They’d shown the Angolans how to survive being hit by an anti-tank mine by leaving the hatches of their armoured personnel carriers open. Battening down the hatches meant that the blast wave inside the vehicle had no-where to go and flattened those inside. “If you leave it open, you might get away with concussion and perhaps some shrapnel wounds…” wrote translator Igor Zhdarkin. They had taken to brewing rice vodka and the Russians said afterwards they’d listen to the Voice of Moscow, Voice of America, BBC and the South African Broadcasting Corporation - the SABC. They spent a lot of time drinking, as Russian advisor Vyacheslav Barabulya explains in the book Bush War published in 2007. They were experiencing daily bombardments by the SADF artillery and said that they’d managed to tap into the almost 100 percent proof alcohol used in the Pechora anti-aircraft system.

Last episode we heard about the failed first battle of the Tumpo Triangle, officially known as Tumpo one which took place on February 25th 1988. You know that things aren’t going well when battles are numbered, and there would be three attempts at overrunning FAPLA in its defensive positions east of the Cuito River, outside Cuito Cuanavale. Still, some good news had filtered in a few days after the audacious attack on SWAPO facilities in Lubango. This was a town that lies nearly 300 kilometers north of the cutline, in the Angolan highlands, a jump off point for FAPLA as it sent its soldiers into the fighting in the south east, along the South West African border. A bomb had exploded at Oshikati First National Bank in Ovamboland on the 19th February, killing 20 people, wounding six. The South Africans wanted revenge, and decided to target SWAPOS training base at Lubango. Planning for the raid began immediately after the blast, and continued all the way through until the next morning, led by Colonel John Church of the SA Air Force. The Mirages were refuelled while the men were briefed, and at 08h00 they took off from Ondangwa, heading north west towards Lubango. Major Norman Minne led this attack flying F1AZ 218. It had the most accurate navigation system, errors were less than a mile at way points. As they flew low level from the southeast, the compact warning receiver or CRWS began picking up signals from the Soviet Barlock search radar - they had been spotted. Minne descended lower and lower, only a few feet off the deck by this stage, but his navigation system was spot on so he folded his map confident he’d find the target. Back on the eastern front, outside Cuito Cuanavale, Colonel Pat McLoughlin had decided to launch the next assault on the Tumpo Triangle at night. Unlike the first attempt to take Tumpo, this time 61 Mech’s Mike Muller planned to use the northern route through the Chambinga high Ground, then down the tricky Heartbreak hill steep drop into the Anhara Lipanda - and then to charge directly at FAPLA positions. The night of February 29th was chosen, with the battle set to continue into Tuesday 1st March if necessary. While the final plans were being checked and double checked, on the other side of the River, the Cubans had sent combat engineers to re-mine the route in the north, and these men ran into a reconnaissance patrol - either it was the South Africans or UNITA. The SADF didn’t report this anywhere, so it was probably UNITA. Their patrol apparently turned and fled into the darkness, and FAPLA engineers laid another 150 mines - there were now 15 000 in total across this part of eastern Cuito Cuanavale. But now the Angolans were almost certain the next attack was going to come from the north East. The SADF did not know that the Angolans knew with almost 100 certainty the direction of the next South African attack.

It was D-Day for the next attack across the open ground east of the Tumpo Triangle, just outside Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The town was now regarded as a moral prerequisite rather than strategic necessity, Luanda’s position here was no surrender, while in Pretoria, the political leadership knew that they could not take the town. This would have prompted an escalation which the National Party could not afford at this moment in their history. The South African economy was weakening, and the public support for this long war in Angola had ebbed significantly. As you’ve heard, the Cubans and Angolans with the Russian advisors were dug in and ready to the east of Cuito Cuanavale, dozens of tanks, thousands of men, covered by Su-22 and MiG fighter jets and ground support aircraft, M-46 heavy artillery ranged and ready, the terrifying Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns horizontal, ready to pound the Ratels. Mike Muller’s 61 Mech was going to launch itself into this flatland on 25th February 1988, a direct assault on a heavily fortified position with fewer men. Not what the military handbook says - as we all know. If you do not have the element of surprise, then you need 3 to 1 odds in your favour, however poorly trained you believe the other side may be. The Angolans by now were not as poorly trained as the SADF liked to think. FAPLA been fighting the South Africans since 1975 and had learned a great deal over the past 13 years.